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The Supreme Court, Visibility, and
the "Politics of Presence"
Kathryn Abrams*
Jane Schacter has made a critical contribution by elaborating
the meaning and potential consequences of the Court's holding in
Romer v. Evans.1 At the center of her account is the thought-provok-
ing suggestion that the Court's opinion enables a visibility or
"presence" for gays and lesbians in the extended realm of the
"political."2 While I salute her illumination, I am less certain about
whether to share her optimism. In this Comment, I will explore the
latter question by looking beyond the decision in Romer to other cases
involving group-based civil rights. I will probe the effects of Supreme
Court decisionmaking on the "politics of presence," which I define as a
society-wide conversation about the political consequences of conceiv-
ing people as members of groups rather than as unmarked individ-
uals. 3 I will argue, in particular, that the Court's decision in Shaw v.
Reno4 (and its progeny) has strong negative consequences for the
visibility of minority political interests, and for the development of a
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School. The research that contrib-
uted to this comment was supported by the Benjamin Mazur Summer Research Fund of the
Northwestern University School of Law.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996).
2. Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 361,
403-05 (1997).
3. Anne Phillips uses this term in the title of her recent book, The Politics of Presence
(Oxford U., 1995), to describe a politics that focuses on identity group diversity and
representation. Although there are differences in our understandings, my definition above
shares much in common with Phillips's effort, in an earlier work, to describe how "democracies
deliver on equality while accommodating and indeed welcoming difference": "The questions
then turn on the kind of politics that can recognize and legitimate group difference while
resisting fragmentation into discrete and local identities, and the kind of solidarity that becomes
possible if we give up on the presumption of an undifferentiated humanity." Anne Phillips,
Democracy and Difference 2 (Pennsylvania State U., 1993).
4. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). In Shaw, the Court held that "majority-minority" districts cre-
ated to provide racial or language minorities with equal electoral opportunity may be challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 649. The theory of the decision is that race-conscious
districting-that is, districting in which race is the basis for or predominant factor in drawing
district lines-violates the right of citizens to participate in a "color-blind electoral process." Id.
at 641-42 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Shaw and the cases that follow, see notes 17-
19, such districting is subject to strict scrutiny. 509 U.S. at 642-43.
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politics of presence that comprehends issues of race. I will conclude
by considering how this interpretation might be reconciled with the
view Professor Schacter takes of Romer.
Professor Schacter argues that "legally and socially
coerced... invisibility" is a central feature of gay and lesbian
existence, and an important cause of gay inequality.5 By striking
down Amendment 2, a measure that exacerbated coerced invisibility,
the Court in Romer enabled gays and lesbians to appear to a greater
extent in the extended political domain. This appearance itself is
salient, because of its potential to ameliorate political inequality and
raise public consciousness; it is also the first step toward engendering
a broader debate about the consequences of this group's, and other
groups', "presence" in politics. I agree with Professor Schacter's
account of coerced invisibility as constituting a unique feature of gay
and lesbian existence; but for the purposes of this Comment I am
going to give a different reading to this group's dilemma about
visibility in politics, what Eve Sedgwick has called a "universalizing"
rather than a "minoritizing" construction.6  In the ongoing
conversations, negotiations, and entanglements that constitute the
extended sphere of politics, most socially marginalized groups
struggle with questions of visibility and presence:7 How visible is our
group? What acts affect the extent to which we are seen, and the
images according to which we are understood? What are the personal
costs associated with efforts to attain greater visibility? In answering
these questions, many groups confront a fact faced early and often by
gays and lesbians: group members are not the only ones who control
the way, or the extent to which, the group is seen in the extended
world of the political. A range of social and institutional forces shape
questions of group visibility and image; these forces affect the ability
of group members both to make claims for themselves and to explore
a politics that gives a more central place to group membership.
Among these characterizing forces, and central to our discussion here,
is the Supreme Court.
5. Schacter, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 369 (cited in note 2).
6. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet 1 (U. of California, 1990).
Sedgwick describes a "minoritizing view" as "seeing homo/heterosexual definition ... as an issue
of active importance primarily for a small, distinct, relatively fixed homosexual minority," and a
.universalizing view" as "seeing it... as an issue of continuing, determinative importance in the
lives of people across the spectrum of sexualities." Id.
7. It is surely worth noting, however, that not all groups struggle with questions of
literal visibility. Although visible difference often functions as the paradigm in this society
(perhaps because of the paradigmatic character of racial difference in American legal thinking
about difference), it is not the only form of difference, or even the most salient from a constitu-
tional standpoint. For a further elaboration on this point see note 13 and accompanying text.
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How does the Court influence group-based appearance and
visibility? Sometimes it does so simply by projecting an image of a
particular group. When the Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
rejected the serious psychological injury requirement in sexual har-
assment cases,9 it projected an image of women as impeded, but not
wholly compromised, by sexualized treatment. In such cases, the
Court's opinion helps to create an epistemological backdrop,
contributing to what Professor Schacter calls "the ongoing normative
enterprise that is a central part of our collective life."'1 Such decisions
make it easier for people to see certain images of women and more
difficult for them to see others.
Other cases affect not the particular way that group members
are seen, but whether they are seen as group members at all. Within
this category is Romer, in which the Court's decision affected the
ability of gays and lesbians to appear in the social realm, and,
ultimately, to define their political interests. But also within this
category is Shaw v. Reno, a case with a potentially devastating impact
on the visibility of racial minority groups. To help think about the
effects of Shaw, I will distinguish several different types of visibility
that operate in the lives of politically marginalized groups. These
categories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they intended to be. As
I note below, 1 the connections between them may help to expand the
doctrinal impact of cases such as Romer.
The first type of visibility I have in mind might be referred to
as "literal" visibility. This type of visibility is achieved when observ-
ers become aware that a person is a member of particular group. For
members of many groups, such as women or racial minorities, this
type of visibility follows inevitably from one's physical appearance:
for better or for worse, when one is physically present, others are
aware of one's group membership. 12 For members of other groups,
including gays and lesbians, religious groups, and persons with dis-
abilities such as deafness or dyslexia, the attributes that mark one as
a member of a particular group are not physically apparent. For peo-
ple in this category, group membership must be made obvious by
8. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
9. Id. at 22-23.
10. Schacter, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 405 (cited in note 2).
11. See text accompanying notes 25-27.
12. There are, however, exceptions even within these categories. For a compelling
discussion of the experience of "being black and looking white in a society which does not handle
anomalies very well," see Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White,
Different, and the Same, 2 Yale J. L. & Feminism 305, 305 (1990).
1997] 413
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
verbal communication or some other aspect of self-presentation (for
example, crossing oneself, using sign language, or expressing physical
affection for one's same sex partner).13 With respect to this second
category of groups, willingness to publicly identify oneself as a group
member-to make one's difference obvious, though not literally vis-
ible, to observers-may be affected by social prejudice or hostility
toward the group-based characteristic. This is the phenomenon of
"coerced invisibility" to which Professor Schacter refers. 14 Gays face
particular challenges in making their difference apparent because of
the extent-and in many contexts, the social legitimacy-of antigay
prejudice. Members of all such groups, when deciding whether to
make their differences known, may struggle more or less depending
on the degree of stigmatization they are likely to confront in so doing.
The second type of visibility, which I will call "political visibil-
ity," arises when a person claims group membership as a central and
constitutive feature of her identity. For members of many marginal-
ized groups, political visibility does not follow automatically from
literal visibility. One woman might view gender as a central influ-
ence on who she is, while another defines herself as a person who
happens to be female. The connection is not automatic for gays and
lesbians, but under circumstances of coerced invisibility, there is
considerable overlap between literal and political visibility: the diffi-
cult decision to make group membership visible is usually a reflection
of its centrality to the identity of the actor.
The third form of visibility, which I will call "programmatic
visibility," arises from group members' efforts to connect their group-
based identities with a particular political interest or program. The
more central a group-based characteristic is in the life of a group
13. This feature of non-visible difference has led some to argue that prejudice against such
groups is a less profound problem, either because group members will not suffer it all the time
or because they can avoid suffering it, by declining to verbalize or otherwise disclose their
difference. See, for example, Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54
F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Because homosexuals are generally not identifiable 'on sight'
unless they elect to be so identifiable by conduct,... they cannot constitute a suspect class or a
quasi-suspect class because they do not [necessarily] exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group." (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (1996). This
argument neglects the painful burden of making constant, ongoing decisions about whether to
reveal one's difference in the face of prejudice. However, confronting this argument has helped
me to see the ways in which notions of difference in this society are built upon the assumption of
visible, physical characteristics, and to extend my notion of "literal visibility" to comprehend
groups whose members must make their differences visible, as well as those whose physical
appearance automatically does this work. I am grateful to Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey for
bringing this argument to my attention and encouraging me to think about its consequences.
14. See Schacter, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 369-71 (cited in note 2).
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member, the more likely he or she is to connect it with a political
interest or program; however, not all such members will do so, and
those who do will not do so all the time. If some straight people are
made uncomfortable by the "literal" visibility of gays and lesbians, it
seems to be the political, and particularly the programmatic, visibility
of minority groups that triggers the anxieties of many whites. Recall
Professor Pamela Karlan's interesting conclusion that it was
Democratic efforts to articulate a political program connected with
minority political interests-rather than their use of majority-minor-
ity districts per se-that triggered white flight to the Republicans. 15
A "politics of presence," as I will refer to it in this Comment,
can be described as a politics that seeks to foster and respond to all
three forms of visibility. (It is worth noting, however, that in this
view, endorsing a "politics of presence" need not entail any firm con-
clusions about the kinds of programmatic initiatives that should be
adopted.) Shaw v. Reno, on the other hand, impedes all three kinds of
visibility on the part of minority groups. Let me say a bit about how
this occurs.
Shaw affects minority visibility in two distinct contexts: the
formal legislative process, and the extended political realm of discus-
sion and norm formation to which Professor Schacter refers. As to the
formal process: Shaw concerned the viability of a constitutional chal-
lenge to majority-minority electoral districting, a form of districting
that has made possible the election of increased numbers of minority
representatives. 16 The presence of minority representatives enables
literal visibility at the legislative level-it prevents legislatures from
being all or virtually all white-but it also enables programmatic
visibility: these representatives can pursue political initiatives that
serve some conception of group interest, and contribute to a social
dialogue about what group membership-theirs and others'-should
entail in the political process. By authorizing a constitutional chal-
lenge to majority-minority districts, and by giving it broad scope in
cases like Miller v. Johnson,17 Bush v. Vera,18 and Shaw v. Hunt, 9 the
15. Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50
Vand. L. Rev. 291, 319 (1997) (quoting a South Carolina Democratic Party Chairman who said
"if we gave them what they wanted, it would be a black party").
16. 509 U.S. at 633.
17. 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1995) (holding that the courts should subject
to strict scrutiny any district whose contours are "predominantly motivated" by race or where
traditional race-neutral districting practices are "subordinated" to racial considerations).
18. 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1958-60, 135 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1996) (holding that race-based districting




Court has made it less likely that minority representatives will
achieve either of these forms of visibility at the legislative level.
But additionally, by virtue of the rationale it used to subject
such districting to strict scrutiny, the Court crucially affected the
visibility of minority groups in the more extended political realm. The
Court stated that the assumption of a connection between race and
political interest that underlaid the challenged districts was an insult
to minority voters,2 0 partook of the same stereotyped thinking that
has animated the sorry history of race discrimination and has
fomented racial antagonisms. Setting up a constitutional equivalence
between discrimination, on the one hand, and race-based conceptions
of political interest, on the other,21 is likely to have major
consequences for the ways in which minorities are able to present
themselves in those myriad social interactions that inform politics.
The claim that someone is engaging in stereotyped, discriminatory
thinking is a potent political conversation-stopper. When constitu-
tional law ratifies versions of this claim that are already circulating in
American political culture, it may have a range of deterrent effects. It
may deter ambivalent minority group members from claiming race, at
least publicly, as a salient element of their identity. It may deter
ambivalent minorities and whites from making connections between
race and political programs, or from supporting programs associated
with the interests of a particular racial group. Such ratification may
also have implications for the lives of those less ambivalent about
their racial identity-and I think here of participants in the black
public sphere described by Professor Regina Austin.22  Such
arguments may decrease the receptivity of those outside the black
public sphere to the fruits that emerge from it, because the Court's
assumptions fuel skepticism about the relation between racial iden-
tity and cultural and economic products, and tar such connections
with the brush of invidious stereotyping. The Court's approach could
also deter minorities and whites from pursuing the kinds of reconsti-
tutive ideas that could transform thinking about race and other kinds
19. 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1900-02, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1996) (holding that districting schemes
based predominantly on race must serve "a compelling state interest" and must be "narrowly
tailored to achieve [that] compelling interest").
20. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647-48.
21. One particularly insidious way in which the Shaw Court constructs this equivalence is
to compare the geographically irregular districting at issue in Shaw with the creation in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), of an "uncouth 28-sided figure," designed to remove
black voters from within the boundaries of the municipality. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644-45.
22. Regina Austin, The Black Public Sphere and Mainstream Majoritarian Politics, 50
Vand. L. Rev. 339 (1997).
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of group membership in American politics. In Shaw, the Supreme
Court did not oppose these forms of group erasure, the way Professor
Schacter hypothesizes that it did in Romer. In Shaw, the Court
contributed to erasure.
This judicially-fueled resistance to a politics of presence by
minority groups, moreover, comes at a particularly volatile time.
Critics sometimes characterize the politics of presence as a crude
identity politics in which salient public goods are allocated on the
basis of some compensatory group-derived formula. In fact, claims
about the meaning and political consequences of group membership
are in a phase of transition, brought about in part by intragroup chal-
lenges to the essentialism of early group-based arguments.23
Proponents of a politics of presence are looking toward more complex,
contingent notions of group membership, and more plural-though
sometimes more broadly transformative--conceptions of how group
membership might be recognized in politics and society. Professor
Lani Guinier's advocacy of proportionate interest representation in
voting might serve as an example of this new generation of defini-
tional efforts.24 But these questions are only beginning to be investi-
gated, and this crucial exploration could be harmfully curtailed if the
connection of group membership and political interest that lies at its
core is characterized by the Court as tantamount to invidious dis-
crimination.
So what does this discouraging account suggest about
Professor Schacter's more hopeful reading of Romer? One possibility,
as Professor Schacter admits, 25 is that the Court did not necessarily
intend the message she finds in its opinion. This message is, after all,
quite contrary to the Court's apparent war on the politics of presence.
But it is also possible to put our two views together in other, though
perhaps no more soothing, ways. Perhaps the Court has embraced a
minimalist position-it will establish the preconditions for literal
visibility, but decline to support either political visibility or program-
matic visibility in the political process. One might note, however, that
23. Examples of such arguments in law include Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990) (critiquing race essentialism in work of
leading feminist legal theorists); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Policies, 1989 U. Chi. Legal Forum 139 (critiquing race essentialism of feminist
advocacy and gender essentialism of antiracist advocacy).
24. Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative
Democracy 94-118 (Free Press, 1994).
25. Schacter, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 365 (cited in note 2).
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it is not as easy to stop at literal visibility as the Court might think.
If it facilitates literal visibility via Romer, many of those individuals
who will shoulder even the reduced costs of coming out will be those
who claim their sexual orientation as a central aspect of their
identity. Thus the Court will ultimately foster political visibility as
well. It is also possible that the Court has a more contingent view.
Perhaps the extent to which the Court is willing to intervene in the
political process varies from group to group. This would be a
surprising constitutional theory (particularly from a Court that seems
not to want to mention group membership at all). But this hypothesis
seems almost plausible when Justice O'Connor states that positing
gender-based differences of opinion may acknowledge women's
distinct experiences, 26 but positing race-based differences of opinion
are tantamount to discrimination. 27
Whichever of these hypotheses about Romer turns out to be
true, there is political, as well as intellectual, value in Professor
Schacter's approach. Without arguing that she has divined the
Court's intention, Professor Schacter offers a highly plausible inter-
pretation of Romer that positions the Court as an aid to the visibility
of gays and lesbians in the political sphere. This vision of the Court
as enabling group visibility, coupled with an emphasis on the connec-
tions among different types of visibility, might be used to critique
opinions like Shaw and redirect the Court toward a role where it
facilitates, rather than thwarts, a politics of presence. This strategy
might serve to educate a Court that, one can only hope, has not com-
pletely foreseen the political consequences of all of its recent deci-
sions.
26. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431-32, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Show, 509 U.S. at 646 (arguing that a race-based reapportionment plan "reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic
status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and
will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as
impermissible racial stereotypes").
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